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Abstract
Miranda Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice and remedies for this injustice are
widely debated. This article adds to the existing debate by arguing that theories of recog-
nition can fruitfully contribute to Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice and can
provide a framework for structural remedy. By pairing Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical
injustice with theories of recognition, I bring forward a modest claim and a more radical
claim. The first concerns a shift in our vocabulary; recognition theory can give a name to
the seriousness of the long-term effects of hermeneutical injustice. The second claim is
more radical: thinking of hermeneutical injustice as preventing what I call “self-recogni-
tion” provides a structural remedy to the phenomenon of hermeneutical injustice.
Because hermeneutical injustice is first and foremost a structural injustice, I contend
that every virtue theory of hermeneutical justice should be complemented by structural
remedies in terms of recognition. Finally, what I argue sheds light on the seriousness of
cases of exclusion of and discrimination against women in academia and helps to draw
our attention to new ways to combat such problems.
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Theories of hermeneutical injustice, epistemic injustice, and epistemic violence have
gained a wide reception over the last few years (cf. Dotson 2011; Pohlhaus 2012;
Hull 2017; Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus 2017, to name only a few). This is partly
because theories of epistemic injustice have given expression to a phenomenon experi-
enced by many. Recently, there has been further interest in the relation between
epistemic injustice and the concept of recognition (cf. McConkey 2004; Pohlhaus
2012, 105–6; Congdon 2017; Bratu and Lepold 2018; Giladi 2018). These inquiries
focus on questions such as the normative status of the knower (Congdon 2018) or
the possibility of resisting epistemic injustices (Doan 2018; Medina 2018).1 The general
motivation behind these endeavors can be put like this: philosophically investigating
different forms of epistemic injustice can actually help combat these injustices in the
social world (cf. Medina 2017, 45).
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With this article, I seek to contribute to this intellectual endeavor. By pairing
Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice with theories of recognition. I argue that
instances of hermeneutical injustice are deeply entangled with relations of misrecogni-
tion in at least two senses: they (1) are the result of a prior history of misrecognition
(especially, hermeneutical marginalization) and (2) render speakers vulnerable to
future acts of misrecognition.2 I bring forward a modest claim and a more radical
claim.3 The first concerns a shift in our vocabulary; according to Fricker, structural
hermeneutical injustice can bring about serious harms even in the aftermath of such
injustice, for example, the victim of epistemic injustice can be prevented from self-
development. This harmful consequence can be spelled out in terms of recognition.
Instances of hermeneutical injustice amount to receiving less or no recognition from
others, which can compromise what I call self-recognition. Although this is not a
new idea, recognition theory can give a name to the seriousness of the long-term
effects of hermeneutical injustice. The second claim is more radical: thinking of her-
meneutical injustice as preventing self-recognition includes a shift in our answer to
the question of how to tackle hermeneutical injustice. In other words, we should
now ask: How can self-recognition be fostered? Following Axel Honneth, we can pro-
vide three distinct but interdependent answers: self-recognition can be fostered by love,
esteem, and respect. Fricker’s own virtue theory of epistemic justice is in line with the
first two, but she misses the last one. Her theory focuses on the individual virtues we
should develop to thwart hermeneutical injustice. However, hermeneutical injustice is
a structural injustice, and thus in need of a structural solution. I argue that respect pro-
vides a structural remedy to the problem of misrecognition of hermeneutical injustice
and should therefore complement any theory of epistemic justice. My general goal in
this article is to show how theories of recognition can add important components to
Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice and, in particular, help us better understand
forms of discrimination and exclusion in academia. Hopefully, this can contribute to
finding structural strategies against hermeneutical injustice in general and discrimina-
tory practices in academia in particular.
In the first section, I provide an example of hermeneutical injustice in academia to
set the stage for my investigation of hermeneutical injustices. In the second section,
I show how misrecognition gives a name to the seriousness of the long-term effects of
hermeneutical injustice; in this section, I also provide an account of what I call “self-
recognition.” The absence of recognition by others does not occur only in drastic
cases such as torture and rape, but can also take place in instances of discrimination
or exclusion. In academia, members of minority groups (for example, women) receive
less recognition, that is, experience hermeneutical injustice, and are thus compromised
in their self-recognition. This can lead to underperformance. Having set the stage by
introducing both hermeneutical injustice and recognition theory, I proceed in section
III by making explicit the implications of understanding the injustice of hermeneutical
injustice as a problem of misrecognition, and I argue in section IV that Honneth’s theory
of recognition should complement Fricker’s virtue account of epistemic justice since it
provides a structural remedy. I present conclusions in section V.
I. Hermeneutical Injustice
It is by now widely accepted that members of minority groups suffer from implicit mis-
treatment and outright hostility in academia, especially in philosophy (cf. Haslanger
2008; Yancy 2008; Wylie 2011; Antony 2012; Hutchison and Jenkins 2013; Hänel
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2017) By means of an example, I will show how some of the mistreatment of women in
philosophy is a problem of hermeneutical injustice and misrecognition.4 This example,
even though stylized, is inspired by many women’s experiences in academic philosophy
(including my own).
Imagine Anna, a philosophy student enrolled in a BA program at a prestigious univer-
sity. Since she started her studies, Anna has come to realize that women are underrepre-
sented in the upper echelons of academic philosophy. For instance, she has never been
able to take a class with a female professor as no such person is employed by her depart-
ment. Also, she has attended several meetings of the Society of Women in Philosophy
where she has seen statistics according to which roughly only twenty percent of all full
professorships in philosophy are held by women, even though the number of female stu-
dents receiving their Master’s degrees and even their PhDs is roughly the same as that of
male students. At these meetings, Anna has also learned to use a broad concept of dis-
crimination. According to this concept, a person B discriminates against another person
C vis-à-vis yet another person D if (1) by w-ing, B leaves C worse off than D, (2) B’s w-ing
occurs because B perceives C to be member of some social group G, and (3) the situation
is such that leaving C worse off is not conclusively justified (Lippert-Rasmussen 2017).
Anna’s concept of discrimination is broad insofar as discrimination need not occur will-
fully or even knowingly. But despite her feminist consciousness-raising, Anna has also
been taught that academia is structured by the principle of equality of opportunity.
Every time her professors give grades to their students, they say that they mark their
papers only according to the merit of their content. Of course, not all students will
end up with good marks, but that difference is due entirely to their knowledge and stu-
diousness. Furthermore, Anna is part of a culture in which it is still generally believed that
women do not have careers similar to men because women simply do not want to get top
jobs and instead prioritize other things in life, like childcare.
When Anna fails to get funding for graduate studies but her classmate Bob gets it
even though his grades are considerably lower than hers, she is ill equipped to see
this as an instance of discrimination despite her knowledge of the profession and her
wide conception of discrimination. This is because Anna believes that academia is struc-
tured by the principle of equality of opportunity and because there are prevalent alter-
native narratives that provide her with reasons for why she failed to get funding. In
other words, Anna knows about academia’s problems with women in general, but, at
the same time, she fails to see her own discrimination experience as an instance of it.
Despite her having the conceptual resources to make her experience intelligible, she
fails to do so because of dominant counter-narratives. Anna fails to conceptualize her
experience adequately, because even self-damaging alternative stories have a hold on us.5
How do we account for what is happening to Anna? I claim that Anna’s failure to
make her experience intelligible to herself is a form of hermeneutical injustice.
Fricker introduces hermeneutical injustice as a distinctively epistemic wrong, that is,
“a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker 2007, 1).
She then goes on to define hermeneutical injustice6 as “the injustice of having some sig-
nificant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to
a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource” (155). By iden-
tity prejudices, Fricker means “judgements, which may have a positive or negative
valence, and which display some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to
counter-evidence” (35) and that affect “people in virtue of an aspect of their social iden-
tity” (155). Identity prejudices are structural insofar as they perceive individuals through
some group membership and only indirectly relate to the mental set-up of individual
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persons (155). In the case of hermeneutical injustice, the structure affected by identity
prejudices is a society’s collective hermeneutical resource.
Fricker illustrates how identity prejudices can lead to hermeneutical injustice by dis-
cussing two examples. First is the case of Wendy Sanford, who blamed herself (and who
was also blamed by her husband) for being a bad mother. However, a friend brought her
along to a feminist consciousness-raising meeting, where she learned the concept of post-
partum depression. This helped her realize that what she had been experiencing was not a
“personal deficiency,” but “a combination of physiological things and a real societal thing,
isolation” (149). The second case is that of Carmita Wood, who felt “ashamed and
embarrassed” (150) by the sexual behavior of one of her superiors.7 After she quit her
job in order to avoid his aggressive advances, she was unfairly denied unemployment
benefits. Fricker contends that Wood could not gain “a proper understanding” (151)
of her situation because she did not possess the concept of sexual harassment—a term
coined by feminists to denounce such outrageous behavior as that of Wood’s superior.
In both cases, the women affected by hermeneutical injustice were prevented from com-
ing to a correct assessment of their experience. Yet there is an obvious difference between
Wendy Sanford or Carmita Wood and the woman in our example, Anna. Whereas
Sanford and Wood were prevented from an adequate assessment of their situations
because of a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource—the terms postpartum depres-
sion and sexual harassment were not available to them when they needed them to be—
Anna does not suffer from a lack of suitable concepts. In fact, Anna has all the relevant
concepts at her disposal, but still fails to assess the experience adequately.
To make sense of this phenomenon, I now turn to some competing accounts of her-
meneutical injustice. Charlie Crerar claims that there can be cases of hermeneutical
injustice where an agent has all the relevant concepts at hand, and where these concepts
are adequate (Crerar 2016),8 but the agent still fails to use them due to interfering soci-
etal taboos. To make his case, Crerar claims that the specific taboo concerning menstru-
ation prevents women from developing an accurate understanding of their experiences.
Hence, he concludes that we need to expand Fricker’s account to accommodate other
examples besides the ones that Fricker uses, in which the injustice amounts to lacking
a relevant concept. However, as Ishani Maitra, and Christine Bratu and I argue (Maitra
2018; Bratu and Hänel 2019), Fricker’s original definition of hermeneutical injustice is
broad enough to accommodate a wide range of cases already; the call for expansion is
therefore unnecessary. Maitra notes that according to the definition given above, herme-
neutical injustices do not necessarily need to involve hermeneutical gaps and that the
notion can be used whenever there is a hermeneutical interference with our under-
standing (Maitra 2018, 3). Christine Bratu and myself argue that Fricker brings forward
two things: a broad definition of hermeneutical injustices and narrower examples of the
same phenomenon (Bratu and Hänel 2019, unpublished manuscript). Hence, one could
easily be misguided in thinking of hermeneutical injustice as a narrow notion, when in
fact the given definition is sufficiently broad to encompass a whole range of cases.
Accordingly, Anna’s example can be understood as a case of hermeneutical injustice.
Although Anna does not suffer from a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource,
she is prevented from understanding her experience adequately due to the hermeneu-
tical interference of misguided but dominant background narratives of academia. Such
narratives are structured by the principle of equality of opportunity and the myth that
women do not want to stay in academia.
If Anna’s case is an example of hermeneutical injustice, then we can ask, what does
the hermeneutical injustice do to her? In other words, what is the particular harm that
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is done to victims of hermeneutical injustice? According to Fricker, hermeneutical
injustice leads to (at least) two distinct harms, a primary harm and a secondary
harm. The primary harm of hermeneutical injustice “consists in a situated hermeneu-
tical inequality” (Fricker 2007, 162, emphasis in original). The epistemic agent is
excluded from contributing to the collective hermeneutical resource on the grounds
of a structural identity prejudice; the agent is excluded from participating in the produc-
tion of knowledge. Furthermore, as Katharine Jenkins convincingly argues, such exclu-
sion also robs agents of their ability to contest the unfair treatment that they received
(Jenkins 2016, 11). The secondary harm concerns the practical consequences that result
from the hermeneutical exclusion. Experiencing hermeneutical injustice is harmful
because “it tends to knock your faith in your own ability to make sense of the world,
or at least the relevant region of the world” (Fricker 2007, 163). Hence, according to
Fricker, failing to understand one’s situation leads to cognitive dissonance, and this
in turn entails a “loss of epistemic confidence” (163) in oneself. Such a loss of epistemic
confidence is unsettling and harmful in itself, but it also “brings secondary epistemic
disadvantages” (163) as it might prevent the people affected from gaining new knowl-
edge or important epistemic virtues (cf. 163), such as intellectual courage, for instance.
Thus, Anna is at least doubly harmed: she is harmed by the hermeneutical exclusion
and by the consequences that such an exclusion has in regard to her epistemic confi-
dence. However, Fricker argues that the primary harm of hermeneutical exclusion
can lead to a further disadvantage. Hermeneutical injustice can result in the social con-
stitution of agents into something they are not, or into something that is not in their
interest to be. In other words, hermeneutical injustice can prevent agents “from becom-
ing who they are” (168). This is especially the case in cumulative and severe acts of her-
meneutical injustice, which can harm an agent even in the aftermath of the actual
situation of injustice. Accordingly, hermeneutical injustice can “sometimes [be] so dam-
aging that it cramps the very development of self” (163).
Next, I turn to theories of recognition to show that they can give expression to the
seriousness of this additional harm of hermeneutical injustice. This is a modest claim. I
propose a redescription of the harm of hermeneutical injustice that highlights the long-
term suffering that cases of hermeneutical injustice can yield as well as the psychological
effects on its victims. I argue that when hermeneutical injustice prevents agents from
becoming who they are, we can adequately express this harm in terms of misrecogni-
tion. I attempt to do so by highlighting the relation between acts of recognition and
what I call self-recognition, and the relation between self-recognition and hermeneutical
injustice. Roughly, the harmful experience of hermeneutical injustice not only leads to
loss of epistemic confidence, but also compromises who we think we are. By framing
hermeneutical injustices as problems of misrecognition, we can see the relation between
these injustices and self-recognition, that is, our self-respect, self-esteem, and self-
confidence. To do so, I will first look at some theories of recognition and misrecogni-
tion. Second, I will introduce the term self-recognition, and third, I will bring forward an
argument according to which hermeneutical injustice amounts to a problem of misre-
cognition and thus compromises self-recognition.
II. The Wrong of Hermeneutical Injustice: Compromising Self-Recognition
Contemporary recognition theory has its roots in writings as far back as Rousseau, but
it is most commonly associated with German idealism, especially the theories of Fichte
and Hegel.9 Both Fichte and Hegel were concerned with how structures of
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intersubjectivity and intersubjective recognition are constituted. Their ideas were taken
up by Marx in his early analysis of the social relations of wage-labor, including both
their identity-constituting character and capitalist deformations, such as became clear
with the concept of alienation (cf. Zurn 2010, 2). Theories of recognition are always
linked to theories of identity, where identity means “a person’s understanding of
who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being”
(Taylor 1994, 25). The underlying idea is that who we are is shaped by recognition, mis-
recognition, or the absence of recognition by others. This identity-recognition relation
implies that
a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or
society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contempt-
ible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can
be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced
mode of being. (25)
Take the example of women in patriarchy. Feminists have long argued that women who
live in patriarchal or sexist social systems come to have a distorted image of themselves.
They see themselves as inferior or as objects whose purpose it is to please and submit.
This implies that even when women’s external social conditions improve, they cannot
so easily free themselves from their distorted self-understanding, their self-hatred and
low self-esteem.10 Thus, Charles Taylor is correct in stressing that misrecognition is
more than “just a lack of due respect,” rather it is the absence of a “vital human
need” (26). What is important here is the idea that as social agents, we can flourish
only if we have meaningful relationships of (mutual) recognition. In other words, we
fail to identify with our experiences and actions unless we do so in relation to others
and within a community (cf. Taylor 1994; Neuhouser 2000; Pippin 2008; Honneth
2011). Thus, recognition not only helps us to value our own projects but makes it pos-
sible for us to have such projects in the first place. This implies that misrecognition or
the absence of recognition can impede our investments in our own projects and in who
we are.11
Many recognition theorists distinguish among three different forms of recognition:
(1) equal recognition for all persons; (2) differential recognition of the uniqueness of
specific features; and (3) recognition of individuality in contexts of care (cf. Taylor
1994; Honneth 1995). The first and second form are also often referred to in terms
of “equal respect” and “esteem due to one’s achievements,” the third one as love
and/or friendship. These three forms of recognition are already present in Hegel’s writ-
ings and are still the main focus of the contemporary debate. According to Honneth,
they comprise the distinct stages that individuals go through when they gain self-
confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem (Honneth 1995).12 In other words, these
three forms of recognition—respect, esteem, and love—are intersubjective conditions
that are needed for agents to develop self-respect, self-esteem, and self-confidence; it
is because of these forms of recognition that we can constitute our own identity. For
Honneth, these three forms of recognition—gained from our legal relations, our com-
munities, and our primary relationships—build different components of our personal-
ity. Analogous to the three forms of recognition—respect, esteem, and love—Honneth
distinguishes among three forms of misrecognition: (1) denial of rights and exclusion;
(2) denigration and insult; and (3) physical abuse, torture, and rape. The first shatters
the self-respect of victims, the second shatters their self-esteem, and the third robs them
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of their basic self-confidence. By doing so, the three forms of misrecognition threaten
different parts of people’s identity: their social integrity, their honor and dignity, and,
lastly, their physical integrity (Honneth 1995, 129).
I agree with Honneth that misrecognition can shatter different parts of a person’s
identity. However, I want to remark that a person’s identity cannot be neatly split
into three different parts—social integrity, honor and dignity, and physical integrity
—where each part is threatened by a different form of misrecognition. For example,
it is not the case that a rape victim’s mere physical integrity is shattered by an act of
rape. Instead, rape victims report that the attack against them destroys their bodily
integrity as well as their social integrity and their honor and dignity. Susan Brison
describes in detail how the violence of rape can shatter victims’ trust in themselves,
in their bodies, and in the world around them (Brison 2002). One of the horrors of
rape is precisely that it destroys not merely victims’ physical integrity but also their
social integrity and dignity. This is why many moral philosophers have argued that
rape should be understood as an act of dehumanization, “soul murder,” or moral injury
(cf. Gardner and Shute 2000; Archard 2007; Miller 2009; Bernstein 2015; Mikkola
2016). Furthermore, we should not so readily assume that only acts of abuse and
rape can destroy a person’s basic self-confidence, whereas denial of rights and denigra-
tion instead destroy someone’s self-respect and self-esteem. Rather, acts of discrimina-
tion or denigration and insult—especially if these are experienced over a longer
period—can lead to the destruction of a person’s self-confidence as well. For example,
Frantz Fanon famously writes about the shame and self-contempt he felt from being
singled out as a black person and the ways in which his black identity is constructed
by others and adopted by him (Fanon 1952/2008). Being denied the same treatment
as everyone else or being addressed differently from others can indeed lead to the
loss of self-confidence—even if this is a slow and unconscious process and thus quite
different from a violent attack. Let us instead claim that a person’s identity is composed
of many overlapping parts—for example, social integrity, honor and dignity, and phys-
ical integrity—where all of them can be threatened by acts that deny someone’s due
respect, esteem, and care. This is important for seeing the relation between hermeneu-
tical injustice and self-recognition, since acts of hermeneutical injustice are precisely not
acts of abuse but acts of exclusion and denigration.
We can now say that recognition in the form of respect, esteem, and love provide the
necessary elements from which we can develop self-respect, self-esteem, and self-
confidence so as to shape our identities. As I have argued above, it is not only one
form of misrecognition that can threaten just one part of our identity, but rather,
any misrecognition can threaten our entire identity as such. I will thus use the term self-
recognition when referring to the cluster of self-respect, self-esteem, and self-
confidence.13 Hence, misrecognition or the absence of recognition—be it in the form
of denial of rights and exclusion, denigration and insult, or abuse and rape—can
threaten our self-recognition. And self-recognition is an essential component of our
identity. It is necessary for us to have projects and to value these projects. In other
words, recognition has a causal relation to self-recognition and therefore for our capa-
bilities to define ourselves and to make and value our own projects (cf. Honneth 1995).
Here I make a psychological claim. In some instances, misrecognition or the absence of
recognition causally brings about compromise of our self-recognition.
What then is the relation between self-recognition and hermeneutical injustice? At
first glance, it might seem that misrecognition and hermeneutical injustice are two
very distinct phenomena that have nothing in common. However, I want to argue
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that hermeneutical injustice can be understood as a problem of misrecognition.14
Roughly, my argument goes as follows. Self-recognition is conditioned by recognition
from others (either through love and esteem or through [partly institutional]
respect), and self-recognition can be compromised by misrecognition or the absence
of recognition by others. Hermeneutical injustice—the wrong done to someone in
their capacity as a knower—is the result of a prior history of acts of misrecognition.
Being hermeneutically marginalized (the precondition for suffering from hermeneu-
tical injustice) is due to a lack of respect and esteem that we owe persons as knowers.
Furthermore, hermeneutical injustice can compromise recognition by others and
thus curtail self-recognition. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when one is unable to
understand and articulate a (harmful) experience due to a structural identity preju-
dice that excludes certain groups from properly participating in our knowledge prac-
tices. In some cases, when we fail to articulate our experiences to others, we also fail
to gain their recognition. We fail to gain recognition in these cases in two ways: (1)
We fail to articulate our experience because of a conceptual lack or social hindrance,
and (2) because the listener does not commit to understanding our experience.15
Consider (1): we fail to adequately understand and articulate our experience due
to a structural identity prejudice that prevents the collective hermeneutical resource
from containing or developing the conceptual means required to make sense of our
social lives. This is because, structurally, we are not granted the same recognition as
others. Consider Fricker’s paradigmatic examples of hermeneutical injustice. Wendy
Sanford and Carmita Wood were unable to fully understand and articulate their
experience of postpartum depression and sexual harassment because both
concepts were missing from the collective hermeneutical resource. The collective her-
meneutical resource was lacking these concepts because some social groups, that is,
(black) women, had less power to contribute to it. In other words, the social group
of women was granted less epistemic authority than other social groups such that
women were unable to contribute to the resource in similar ways. This can be
redescribed as a recognition problem. Members of some social groups receive less
recognition than others. They are excluded from contributing epistemically in signif-
icant ways.
Next consider (2): when we try to articulate a (harmful) experience, we are vulner-
able, we expect acknowledgment and sympathy on the part of the listener. We would
not try to articulate our experience knowing that the response would be silence, disbe-
lief, or contempt. In fact, this is precisely why so many victims of sexual violence refrain
from telling others about their experiences—they suspect (and often rightly so) that the
articulation of what happened to them would not be met with sympathy. When such a
personal encounter ends with silence, disbelief, or contempt, then the listener feels enti-
tled to doubt either my experience as such or its harmful consequences. In other words,
the listener refuses to acknowledge my special standing as a person who can be harmed
and wronged. This, again, is a failure of recognition. Furthermore, even in cases in
which I lack the conceptual resources to express my experience clearly, I still expect
the listener to acknowledge my feelings and to try to understand what happened to
me when I attempt to articulate my experience. If listeners refuse to engage in this
effort, they already fail to grant me the same recognition that they would give others.
Again, this is often because the person who tries to articulate an experience is part
of a social group that receives less epistemic authority. Thus, listeners either fail to real-
ize that they make less effort to understand the experience of the other person or they
discard it as unproblematic due to the social group membership of the other. I will
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return to this point shortly. In both cases, (1) and (2), it is because of our membership
in a specific social group that we lack recognition in a personal encounter (esteem or
love) and in the social structure at large (respect).
Framing hermeneutical injustice as a problem of recognition enables us to claim that
hermeneutical injustice not only compromises recognition—those who suffer from her-
meneutical injustice have suffered from misrecognition or the absence of recognition
and are vulnerable to future acts of misrecognition or the absence of recognition—
but it also compromises self-recognition. In other words, instances of hermeneutical
injustice are harmful because they can leave us without self-respect, self-esteem, and
self-confidence; they destroy our capability to form an identity. And, because herme-
neutical injustice is due to a structural identity prejudice, members of marginalized
social groups in particular suffer from past and future misrecognition and are compro-
mised in their personal identity. This is in line with arguments that misrecognition is a
form of oppression: it leaves people with a false view of themselves (cf. Taylor 1994;
Ferrarese 2009). But this is doubly so insofar as misrecognition targets primarily sub-
jects who are already victims of oppression due to their social group membership.
To sum up, the harm of hermeneutical injustice can be redescribed as misrecognition
(or the absence of recognition), and as misrecognition it prevents agents from develop-
ing self-recognition, or what Fricker called the construction of selfhood. This draws our
attention to the seriousness of hermeneutical injustice. Furthermore, being prevented
from developing self-recognition highlights the long-term suffering that hermeneutical
injustice can yield as well as the psychological effects on the victims of hermeneutical
injustice. And, finally, it directs our attention to the subtleties of interpersonal commu-
nication; even in cases in which the relevant concept is missing, the listener should have
made an effort to understand the pain of the speaker, but fails to do so. In the next sec-
tion, I focus on these long-term and psychological effects and, in section IV, I propose
that taking seriously the claim that hermeneutical injustice compromises self-
recognition suggests that there is a general moral requirement to give recognition: either
by granting esteem or (institutional) respect.16 I then take the proposal for such a moral
requirement to flesh out the structural dimension of recognition in the form of respect
and bring forward a more radical claim, namely that recognition theory should comple-
ment any virtue theory of epistemic justice for its potential as a structural remedy.
III. What We Gain: The Framework of Recognition
We can now say that Anna receives misrecognition in two ways. First, Anna and those
with similar experiences of discrimination could not and cannot contribute to the epi-
stemic landscape in similar ways to those who do not experience discrimination; this
means that stories of discrimination are not as widely shared as counter-narratives
such as the view that academia is a meritocracy. And, second, Anna does not receive
sympathy for her story because it is assumed that she did not work hard enough or
that she willingly chose a different path. That is, Anna is not granted the same recog-
nition and her harm is not acknowledged. This has consequences for who she thinks
she is. In fact, if this is true, then we have to conclude that incidents of hermeneutical
injustice in academia—such as the one Anna experiences—not only directly harm indi-
viduals because they hinder them from adequately understanding their own experience,
but also indirectly harm them because they compromise their self-recognition.17 The
way academia is set up means that Anna is granted less recognition than others,
which has implications for how she defines herself. This is an important insight for
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academia. The cumulative effects of misrecognition or the absence of recognition in
academia are self-reinforcing, that is, they influence future behavior in academia and
elsewhere.18 Each encounter of discrimination or exclusion leaves Anna with less self-
recognition, which in turn means that Anna is less forceful about her ideas and her epi-
stemic contributions (that is, her standing as a knower), has less trust in her own work,
is less confident in academic encounters, and so on. Unfortunately, all of the above can
(together and separately) lead to receiving less recognition by others (cf. Lane, Lane, and
Kyprianou 2004). In other words, the lack of self-recognition produces an asymmetrical
relationship for future communications and a downward spiral for Anna’s academic
success. Hence, academic exclusion is not only harmful to academic success but has
direct consequences for a person’s identity. Obviously, not all cases of exclusion or dis-
crimination in academia lead to diminished self-recognition. First, this is only the case
when a person is unfairly disadvantaged by the collective hermeneutical resource, when
the person is part of an already marginalized group. Second, self-recognition is often
compromised because of the cumulative aspect of hermeneutical injustices. People
who experience only fleeting encounters with such injustice are not often compromised
in their self-recognition. Similarly, people who were able to build a strong sense of self-
recognition beforehand, for example, through love during their childhood and esteem
later in life, are not as easily compromised in their self-recognition as those who did
not have such a fortunate childhood (cf. Keshky and Samak 2017). The degree to
which the self-reinforcing effects of misrecognition are actualized and have conse-
quences for a person’s identity depends on that person’s existing self-recognition (cf.
Aguilar and Nightingale 1994). As a woman in academia, one is very likely to suffer
from cumulative misrecognition and, due to being socialized as a girl and woman,
not to have a strong sense of self-recognition beforehand. Hence, it is likely that
women in academia suffer from diminished self-recognition.
Furthermore, the degree to which the self-reinforcing effects of misrecognition are
actualized and have consequences for a person’s identity also depends on who fails
to give recognition (cf. Valkenburg, Peter, and Schouten 2006). As remarked before,
as social agents, we develop our own identities particularly in dialogue with others
who are close to us.19 Taylor argues that we “do not acquire the languages needed
for self-definition on [our] own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction
with others who matter to us—what George Herbert Mead called ‘significant others’”
(Taylor 1994, 32). It is through conversation with those close to us that we define
ourselves—either in dialogue with or in struggle against them. In other words, the rec-
ognition of those close to us is of particular importance to our self-recognition, as is the
misrecognition or lack of recognition from them. It shakes us in quite different ways if
our father does not give us our due recognition than if recognition is not forthcoming
from the bus driver whose bus we take to school or the fleeting encounter we had this
morning when walking the dog. Our father’s misrecognition has a lasting and deep
effect on us and can seriously hinder our self-recognition. Unless we already have
very low self-esteem, the bus driver’s misrecognition will not have the same effect on us.
The misrecognition or lack of recognition from “significant others” can be especially
devastating for our self-recognition.20 That is, those close to us have a major impact on
our identity and our self-recognition. However, we can expand this claim such that it
enables us to include not only those close to us in a straightforward sense, such as
our family, our partners, our friends, and so on, but also those close to us intellectually.
As philosophers, we build our identity at least partly from conversation and struggle
with other philosophers. And though we do not need their agreement to recognize
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ourselves as their philosophical peers, we do need their recognition in terms of esteem.
In other words, the misrecognition or lack of recognition from those in our philosoph-
ical communities can have similarly damaging effects on our self-recognition as the
misrecognition from our significant others. And since “being a philosopher” is not a
part of our identity that we could decide to abandon easily, but is instead a defining
feature of who we are, being misrecognized by our philosophical peers is even more
damaging. To sum up, academia, and especially philosophy, grants less recognition
to women (and other minority groups) and thus compromises women’s self-
recognition. That is, women in academia are likely to have diminished self-respect,
less self-esteem, and less self-confidence.
This can lead to underperformance such that women in academia judge themselves
to be worse in what they do than they actually are, and therefore produce worse results.
The problem of underperformance has gained wide attention in the research on stereo-
type threat. Stereotype threat
affects the way that members of [a stigmatized] group actually perform. Victims of
stereotype threat underperform on the relevant tasks because they are uncon-
sciously preoccupied by fears of conforming to stereotypes about their group—
so preoccupied that they show elevated heart rates and blood pressure. . . .
Victims of stereotype threat are often, though not always, unaware of what is
happening. (Saul 2013, 41–42; see also Steele 2010, 119–20)
Stereotype threat works whenever a person is reminded of the fact that she is a member
of a social group for which a stereotype exists that is counterproductive for the task at
hand. For example, when they are in so-called threat-provoking situations, women per-
form worse than men in math tests, blacks perform worse than whites in standardized
tests, and so on. Threat-provoking situations are situations in which a person “is from a
group that is negatively stigmatised in a certain context, [the person] is in that context,
and [the person]’s group membership is made salient” (Saul 2013, 42), for example,
when women are asked to state their gender before taking a math test. However,
when the threat is absent, there is hardly any difference between the performance of
the stereotyped group and that of the other. Jennifer Saul shows how bad stereotype
threat is for women in philosophy as it brings women to perform worse than they oth-
erwise could (Saul 2013).
The phenomenon of underperformance due to stereotype threat is slightly different
from underperformance in regard to compromised self-recognition. Women in acade-
mia whose self-recognition is compromised underperform because they define them-
selves as less intelligent, productive, and so on. That is, they internalize the
misrecognition from others. Although the psychological process might be similar to
instances of stereotype threat, underperformance due to compromised self-recognition
is far more persistent than underperformance due to stereotype threat. Above, I dis-
cussed Taylor’s example of women who come to adopt the distorted image of them-
selves displayed by patriarchal norms. Even when external circumstances are better,
these women still suffer from their distorted definition and cannot simply switch
their identity. Misrecognition or the absence of recognition motivates members of mar-
ginalized social groups to adopt distorted identities of themselves. It is because of their
distorted identity that women in academia underperform in tasks that they are other-
wise well suited to perform.
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IV. Hermeneutical Injustice and Structural Remedies
So far, I have brought forward a modest claim: understanding the harm of hermeneu-
tical injustices as a problem of misrecognition gives a name to the seriousness of the
harm and the long-term psychological effects that it can bring about. Let me now
turn to the more radical claim about pairing the theory of hermeneutical injustice
with recognition theory. Consider Anna again, who suffers from hermeneutical injus-
tice in academia, along with its primary and secondary harms. The primary harm of
being excluded from contributing to knowledge practices manifests itself in the very
construction of Anna’s selfhood. Being denied academic recognition, Anna becomes
uncertain about her intellectual capacities, her epistemic value, and, ultimately, about
being a philosopher. Fricker suggests that a remedy for hermeneutical injustice is to
develop the virtue of hermeneutical justice. She writes,
[t]he form the virtue of hermeneutical justice must take, then, is an alertness or
sensitivity to the possibility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as she
tries to render something communicatively intelligible is due not to its being non-
sense or her being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in collective hermeneutical
resources. (Fricker 2007, 169)
But Anna’s diminishing of self-recognition started long before she tried to articulate her
experience and would develop further even without Anna trying to talk about her expe-
riences. In Anna’s case, an alert listener would not do the trick. Furthermore, as others
have argued, hermeneutical injustice is a structural injustice and thus in need of struc-
tural remedies (cf. Anderson 2012; Doan 2018). Elizabeth Anderson, for example,
points to the implicit nature of many biases that bring about epistemic injustices, as
in Anna’s case. Anna’s downward spiral of misrecognition was triggered by implicit
biases against women’s capabilities in philosophy. I want to suggest that the real insight
from recognition theory comes from a new answer to the question of how to tackle her-
meneutical injustice. With the help of recognition theory, we can ask: How can self-
recognition be fostered? As we have seen in the last section, a solid sense of self-
recognition can work as a defense against misrecognition and as a resource to protest
acts of misrecognition (and, thus, hermeneutical injustices).
According to Honneth, recognition comes in at least three ways: as respect, esteem,
and love. Hence, if people receive enough respect, esteem, and love, they are well-
equipped to develop self-recognition—hopefully enough to withstand hermeneutical
injustice. Whereas esteem and love are individualistic notions, respect is not. Respect
confers moral worth in a universal sense; we deserve respect qua being persons.
Esteem, on the other hand, confers moral worth that is given on grounds of an individ-
ual’s distinctive character or accomplishments. Finally, love confers care and attentive-
ness, and shows the beloved person that she is worthy of support and nurture (Honneth
1995, 92–130). Recognition theories that focus on identity have not been without critics.
Nancy Fraser, for example, argues that so-called identity-recognition tends to overlook
structural injustices. She asks, “Is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter
of self-realization?” (Fraser 2003, 27), where the former is her own view and the latter
the view she attributes to Honneth. For Honneth, as well as for Taylor, recognition is a
“vital human need,” and if we do not have experiences of recognition by others, then we
fail to define ourselves. Thus, according to Honneth, misrecognition is a social injustice.
In fact, it is the primary social injustice because it violates “the social confirmation or
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affirmation of our identity claims” (Kompridis 2007, 278). According to Fraser, on the
other hand, recognition does not have a primary causal relation to self-realization or
identity-formation, but is instrumental for us to acquire full status as partners in
any kind of social interaction. Recognition is thus about social status and not about
identity.21 Instead of making psychological claims about identity, we should focus
on social patterns that deem some social groups “as inferior, excluded, wholly
other, or simply invisible” (Fraser 2003, 29). Recognition and misrecognition are
not merely interpersonal failures, rather they are grounded in “institutionalized pat-
terns of cultural value, which regulate social interaction in ways that impede parity
of participation” (Fraser 2007, 310). In other words, misrecognition is a structural
injustice.22
We need not reject the interpersonal dimension to acknowledge that recognition and
misrecognition are also structural phenomena. In fact, we can endorse the psychological
claim that recognition is causally linked to how we define ourselves as well as the struc-
tural claim. It is because as social agents we have a certain social status that we are
capable of developing who we are. Furthermore, although we often have experiences
of recognition or misrecognition in interpersonal encounters, these are not arbitrary
interpersonal achievements or failures, but instead stem from a social system in
which members of some social groups enjoy more power and more recognition than
members of other social groups. For example, women in academia often enjoy less rec-
ognition than, for example, men. This can also be expressed with Honneth’s idea of three
distinct forms of recognition. Whereas esteem acknowledges the specific individual
achievement of a person, respect is a universal acknowledgment. Women in academia
are often misrecognized in both ways: they lack esteem for the specific contributions
they make, but they also lack respect for being knowers in the first place. It is precisely
the idea that we can be harmed as knowers that started the discussion of epistemic injus-
tice and violence. And, though instances of misrecognition often happen in contexts of
interpersonal encounters, it is not due to someone’s personal sympathy for the other
person whether they grant recognition or not but due to the (often unjust) social sche-
mas of who “deserves” recognition and who does not. Thus, I want to endorse the psy-
chological claim that recognition is linked to our identity and can thus compromise our
self-recognition, while at the same time acknowledging that recognition as much as any
other form of power is a structural phenomenon. It is the insight that misrecognition is a
structural phenomenon that makes it especially useful in regard to hermeneutical
injustice.23
The structural component that recognition theory can lend to the notion of herme-
neutical injustice turns on the idea of the normative status of being a “knower.” In short,
having standing as a knower means being recognized as such. Let me explain. We might
not have an equal right for esteem or love, but we do for respect. That is, as persons, we
deserve respect. Hence, individuals as well as institutions have a general moral and legal
requirement to give recognition in the form of respect to others. In cases in which we
fail to give respect, we not only disrespect another person, but we deny them their per-
sonhood; we dehumanize them. In a recent and insightful article, Matthew Congdon
shows that being a knower is an irreducibly ethical concept. He argues that Fricker’s
negative claim about our vulnerability to wrongdoing, which stems from our hermeneu-
tical powers and epistemic access to the world, also implies a positive claim:
[T]hat being a knower is essentially to bear a normative status that is simultane-
ously epistemic and ethical: it is epistemic insofar as the label “knower” indicates
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the roles one may legitimately assume within practices of justification and warrant,
and ethical, in the sense that being a “knower” implicates one within interpersonal
relations of answerability that invoke notions of justice and injustice, flourishing
and degradation, virtue and vice, rightful treatment and moral injury. (Congdon
2018, 2)
Having epistemic agency, being a knower, means having a certain normative standing.
From here, Congdon argues that “simply in describing someone as a bearer of epistemic
agency” means ascribing “to that person an ethical normative standing” (2). Hence, qua
our being as persons and knowers, we deserve recognition in the forms of respect and
epistemic respect, where epistemic respect conveys “the acknowledgement of the min-
imal set of capacities we grant to any knower” (Congdon 2017, 249). These are the min-
imal forms of recognition that we deserve irrespective of our individual capacities or our
specific relations to others; as interrelated humans we deserve respect as well as episte-
mic respect. If we fail to give someone these basic forms of respect, we fail to ascribe
normative standing to them. I suggest that in cases of hermeneutical injustice, the
unsympathetic hearer denies us our fair share of the very basic recognition that we
deserve. In Anna’s case, she is denied the respect of being treated as equal to her class-
mate Bob; due to her social group membership, she was judged to be less worthy of
(epistemic) recognition. This implies that it is not a virtue of a good person to be epi-
stemically just, but rather the very basis of treating others as full persons. It is thus a
serious wrong when we fail to live up to this basic component of social interaction.
We owe it to everyone.
V. Counteracting Hermeneutical Injustice in Academia
We can now conclude that to counteract the damaging effects of hermeneutical injustice
in academia, we have to acknowledge the relational character of justice that is high-
lighted by theories of recognition. At stake in cases of exclusion and discrimination
in academia is someone’s normative status—it is not just a question of disrespect but
of dehumanizing another person. It is not merely about who can achieve a career in
academia, that is, who gets jobs, is invited as a keynote speaker, is published, and so
on. It is also about whose self-recognition can develop adequately. That is, justice has
to do with what treatment vis-à-vis other persons a (woman-)philosopher deserves in
academia. Iris Young argues that justice should be concerned with social group differ-
ences that grant some social groups more power than others and that explicitly
acknowledging these differences is necessary for counteracting mistreatment and
oppression (Young 1990). Furthermore, hermeneutical injustice and misrecognition
are structural problems and they demand a structural solution. Fricker’s suggestion
of epistemic virtues as a remedy to hermeneutical injustice can indeed help in some
cases, but they are ill equipped to tackle the problem in general.24 This becomes espe-
cially clear in the example of women in academia. Had Anna’s application for graduate
funding been approved, her future would have been better but the problem of misrecog-
nition of women in academia would not have been addressed at all. Had Anna’s funding
been rejected but she had met a sympathetic ear, someone who gave her due recognition
as a victim of discrimination, Anna’s personal life would have been better but, again, the
general problem of the misrecognition of women in academia would not have been
addressed. Thus, in the case of hermeneutical injustice in academia, we need to
acknowledge the structural discrimination and exclusion that some social groups suffer
so as to find fruitful ways to resist it. Once we do so, we have laid the foundations for
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tackling hermeneutical injustice in academia—along both the structural and the per-
sonal dimensions—because we have established a common ground according to
which women’s narratives of discrimination can be heard.
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Notes
1 For interesting investigations of the relation between epistemic injustice and recognition, see Giladi and
McMillan 2018; Giladi and McMillan forthcoming.
2 For reasons of simplicity, I speak of hermeneutical injustice as a “problem of misrecognition” in the fol-
lowing, having in mind (1) and (2). I am extremely grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for helping
me to clarify the relation of hermeneutical injustice and misrecognition in this way.
3 Michael Doan brings forward an argument for how theories of epistemic injustice can be used in fruitful
ways by recognition theorists (Doan 2018). Here, I am interested in the other side of the coin, that is, how
theories of hermeneutical injustice can benefit from recognition theory.
4 This example and the accompanied discussion of this case as an instance of hermeneutical injustice is
discussed in detail in Bratu and Hänel (2019). I am deeply grateful to Christine Bratu for many insightful
discussions and the joint work on this topic.
5 Part of why Anna fails to conceptualize her experience adequately is the overall social climate that she
experiences at the university. It is likely that, as a young woman, she did not receive much positive feedback
on her ideas and her writing, other students interrupted her, male students were praised in class even
though they raised the same questions that she had raised earlier, she was not encouraged to continue
studying philosophy, and so on (cf. Haslanger 2008; Antony 2012).
6 Fricker draws a distinction between cases of systematic hermeneutical injustice and cases of incidental
hermeneutical injustice. Here, I am interested only in systematic hermeneutical injustice.
7 Although this is often omitted, it should be mentioned that Carmita Wood suffers from hermeneutical
injustice not only because she is a woman, but because she is a black woman. Black women are subjected to
sexual violence, including sexual harassment, in even greater numbers than other women. This fact does
not change anything about the theory Fricker brings forward, but it highlights the ways in which intersec-
tionality plays a role in our epistemic theories (cf. Berenstain 2016).
8 This is in contrast to the forms of hermeneutical injustice discussed by Jenkins 2016, in which the rel-
evant concepts exist, but the agent uses a distorted working understanding instead.
9 For a full genealogy of the notion of recognition, see Taylor 1994.
10 Linda Nicholson has questioned how far Taylor’s theory of recognition and identity is applicable to
feminist claims. She argues that Taylor is wrong about the way he thinks of identity differentiations in
regard to multiculturalism (Nicholson 1996). Although I think that Nicholson is correct, her issues
touch mostly on Taylor’s discussion of recognition and multiculturalism, and are not directly relevant
for my argument here. I will therefore not discuss them further.
11 Some feminists have criticized theories of recognition grounded in Hegel’s idea of the master–slave dia-
lectic, for example, in Honneth and Taylor. Kelly Oliver, for example, argues that as long as we understand
social relations as essentially antagonistic struggles for recognition, we have a hard time explaining how
these struggles can ever lead to ethical social relations or compassionate personal relations (Oliver
2010). Most recognition theorists think of recognition as necessary for a sense of self, but they also
think of subjectivity as based on antagonism and thus undermine the dialogical character of recognition.
Furthermore, struggles for recognition become struggles against those in power and are therefore part of
the pathology of oppression instead of counteracting it. Similarly, Estelle Ferrarese criticizes the lack of anal-
ysis of power or authority in most recognition theories. According to her, vulnerability is inherent in the
concept of recognition because recognition relies on “the need to constitute the other as an authority in
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order to be recognized” (Ferrarese 2009, 606). Even though I subscribe to the idea that recognition is nec-
essary for successful identity-formation, I do not take on board Honneth’s (and others’) idea of struggle as
necessary for gaining recognition. Instead, I think that the most useful social relations of recognition are
relations of care and dialogue and not of struggle and antagonism. In fact, I find it baffling to think of
the master–slave dialectic instead of a relation of care when it comes to recognition. Thank you to Lea
Prix and Jacob Blumenfeld for countless debates on these issues.
12 Others have suggested that there is a fourth and more elementary form of recognition that grounds the
others. Theories of elementary recognition are concerned with how reason can enter the world in general.
Scholars who argue for elementary recognition take a neo-Hegelian stance and claim that human agents
cooperatively reconstruct the world (cf. Pinkard 1994; Pippin 2008; Ikäheimo and Laitinen 2011). As social
agents, we rely on mutual recognition to give us and others epistemic authority and to enable the construc-
tion of a normative space of reasons.
13 Honneth evokes a similar idea to what I call “self-recognition,” namely “a positive relation-to-self.”
Although nothing much hangs on the wording, it should be noted that his explication of a positive
relation-to-self is slightly different from mine.
14 It might seem that epistemic injustice with its focus on testimonial injustice is a much better candidate
to be paired with the concept of recognition. Paul Giladi, Jane McConkey, Matthew Congdon, and Liz
Disley have explored the relation between epistemic injustice and misrecognition, with McConkey focusing
on testimonial injustice and recognition theories (McConkey 2004; Disley 2015, chap. 5; Congdon 2017;
Giladi 2018).
15 See Dotson 2011 for a detailed argument on how speakers are dependent on the reciprocity given by the
hearer and how the lack of reciprocity can lead to epistemic violence.
16 I say more in the following about the notion of “giving recognition” in the sense of esteem or respect.
Obviously, outside of family or romantic relations, we do not have a moral requirement to give love.
17 Although I focus here on the problem of a lack of self-recognition in academia, I contend that what I
say about the relationship between hermeneutical injustice and theories of recognition can be fruitfully used
for other contexts as well.
18 I want to thank Jekaterina Markow for this insight.
19 Language and dialogue are here meant to encompass a whole range of modes of expression and are not
restricted to the words we utter (Taylor 1994, 32).
20 Remember the rather famous quote from Beauvoir about her philosophical encounters with Sartre and
her resulting epistemic self-doubt: “Day after day, and all day long I measured myself against Sartre, and in
our discussions I was simply not in his class. . . . ‘I’m no longer sure what I think, or even if I think at all,’ I
noted, completely thrown” (Beauvoir 1959, 344, quoted in Fricker 2007, 51).
21 For a detailed explanation of identity and status, see the discussion between Linda Alcoff and Nancy
Fraser (Alcoff 2007; Fraser 2007).
22 It is because instances of misrecognition are grounded in institutionalized patterns of cultural value that
we can see how misrecognition and maldistribution go hand in hand (Fraser 2007, 310).
23 I contend that Fricker’s virtue-theoretical approach fails in some cases (for example, in Anna’s case)
and that because hermeneutical injustice is a structural injustice, the virtue-theoretical approach that
Fricker develops should be supplemented by a recognition-theory approach in terms of respect (institu-
tional as well as individual). To be clear, I do not want to argue that epistemic justice is not a virtue or
that recognition theory necessarily has to work outside a virtue-theoretical approach; instead, I merely
state that recognition theory opens up possibilities for structural remedies that are not in terms of virtue.
24 For a similar point, see Anderson 2012; Giladi 2018.
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